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Small-scale fisheries (SSFs) engage the vast majority of the world’s fishers but are
struggling to keep pace with coastal populations, and stocks are declining to levels
that threaten reproductive capacity. The provision of food and livelihoods to low-income
fishers into the future will be unlikely without radical changes to fisheries policy. We
draw on repeating analogies of driving a car to illustrate fundamental reforms needed for
driving (managing) SSFs. SSFs will continue to be unsustainable by relying too heavily
on output controls (the “brake”). Managers need to move away from routinely using
moratoria (i.e., the “handbrake”) as a management measure, although these measures
may be needed as a last resort. Scientists (“backseat drivers”) must engage more
directly with fishery management agencies to understand their constraints and needs.
Resource managers must come to terms with regulating fishing inputs (the “accelerator”)
by imposing limited-entry rules, vessel limitations, or short fishing seasons in addition to
sensible output controls. Reforms to resource management will need to entail unpopular
measures if SSFs are to deliver sustained benefits to fishing communities into the future.
Keywords: artisanal, coral reef, fishing effort, management measures, fishery regulations, resource, coastal,
governance
Introduction
Artisanal and small-scale fisheries (SSFs) play a crucial role as a source of livelihoods, food security
and income for millions of people around the world in both developed and developing countries
(Allison and Ellis, 2001; Berkes et al., 2001). SSFs abound in developing countries throughout
the tropics because many of the tropical marine fishes and invertebrates are in waters accessible
by shallow fishing gears, breath-hold divers, and intertidal gleaners. Most of the tropical SSFs in
developing countries are complex to manage, being multi-species and multi-gear (Berkes et al.,
2001). They are tied inextricably to the resilience and fate of coastal and reef ecosystems (Hawkins
and Roberts, 2004; Batista et al., 2014), which are simultaneously impacted by global and local
stressors (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007).
In spite of the important role that SSFs play in national and local economies (Mills et al., 2011),
the sector—as compared against other sectors of the world food economy—is poorly planned and
regulated, inadequately funded, and marginalized and often neglected by all levels of government
(Smith, 1979; Kura et al., 2004; World Bank, 2004). SSFs around the globe are frequently overfished
and overexploited as a result of not only weak governance, but, to name just a few issues, of poor
management, perverse subsidies, corruption, unrestricted access, and destructive fishing practices
(CRS, 2006).
If managed more effectively, SSFs can contribute strongly to reducing poverty and improving
food security in developing countries in the long-term. Better management can also avoid
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the continuing collapse of aquatic andmarine ecosystems and the
loss of associated biodiversity occurring throughout the world’s
oceans and aquatic environments (Berkes et al., 2001).
The solutions can be hard fought and complex (McClanahan
et al., 2009; Pomeroy, 2012). However, the underlying tenets of
why management is failing and what elements of the system are
most in need of reform can be better understood when unpacked
in familiar terms. Here, we use an analogy of driving a car to
illustrate the fundamental problems and solutions for ailing SSFs
in developing and low-income countries.
Driving Small Scale Fisheries
SSFs operate from shore or with small vessels (Allison and Ellis,
2001), and (especially regarding artisanal types) involve simple
fishing gears with low capital investment (FAO, 2014). Compared
to industrial fisheries, research on small-scale and artisanal
fisheries lagged until the past decade (Figure 1). The recent
exponential explosion in research on SSFs may be explained
by the realizations that artisanal fishing can profoundly affect
fish and invertebrate stocks globally (Batista et al., 2014) and
that they play a crucial role in poverty reduction and food
security (Allison and Ellis, 2001). Until the 1980s, research on
SSFs mainly concerned biological aspects, but inroads were made
on understanding fishers and fishing communities (Pomeroy,
2015). Research in the 1980s highlighted the importance of a
multidisciplinary approach to research and management, and
literature in the 1990s expanded through a rise in socioeconomic
studies. Governance of SSFs became a major area of research
since 2000 and further literature expanded through a number of
new approaches to SSFs (see Pomeroy, 2015).
Over the past decades, total catches and catch-per-unit-
effort of fishing have declined dramatically in many artisanal
fisheries throughout the tropics (Sadovy, 2005; Zeller et al.,
FIGURE 1 | Publication of scientific journal articles on small-scale and
artisanal fisheries from 1977 to 2014. Data are from a search in SCOPUS
for publications with small-scale, or artisanal, and fisher* (fisher, fishery,
fisheries) in the article title. Clearly, this does not include all articles about
small-scale fisheries, as some titles may not have these words.
2007, 2014; Bender et al., 2014; Muallil et al., 2014). Following
concern for overexploitation and environmental degradation and
poor outcomes of management (CRS, 2006), many institutions
have been improving the objectives and policies for SSFs. The
objectives have shifted from maximizing annual catches and
employment, sustaining stocks, and short-term interests, to a
broader framework for management of marine resources to
achieve sustainable development through improved ecological
and human well-being. Subsequently, there has been a shift in
the types of fisheries management measures used to achieve these
objectives. This constitutes a shift in the brakes, the handbrake,
the accelerator, the steering wheel, and the driver.
A range of forces are compounding the already complex
challenges facing SSFs, namely weak governance, socioeconomic
conditions, local organization, and ecosystem change.
Weak governance is a key underlying cause of overfishing,
characterized by corruption, poor stakeholder participation,
poor enforcement, weak institutional capacity, overcapacity of
fishing fleets, and illegal fishing. Legal, policy, and institutional
frameworks are often not crafted to suit the unique features of
fisheries and this has resulted in mismatches and overlaps (Torell
and Salamanca, 2002)—within nations there are ministries
with opposite goals for instance. Governance reforms in recent
decades have focussed on administrative decentralization, i.e.,
dispersal of power, authority, and responsibility from the central
government to lower or local-level institutions (Pomeroy, 2001,
2003; Cinner et al., 2012a). This shift has effectively put the
steering wheel more into the hands of local institutions and
fishers.
The Steering Wheel
Governance is a lot about who is steering the management of the
fishery. Unlike driving a car, a single organization’s control of
managing the fishery has tended to be unsuccessful. Many SSFs
have remained managed by top-down (government-controlled)
systems with little or no participation of fisher groups (e.g.,
Purcell et al., 2014; Eriksson et al., 2015a).
At the other extreme, too many hands on the wheel has
also been problematic because fishery governance needs good
leadership (Pomeroy et al., 2001; Gutiérrez et al., 2011). This is
evident in places like Zanzibar, where multiple government and
non-government organizations participate in the management of
SSFs yet stocks are severely overfished (Eriksson et al., 2015b).
Experience has shown that co-management over the decision-
making and strategy of SSF management is beneficial (Castilla
and Fernandez, 1998; Cinner et al., 2012b), although does not
guarantee a successful fishery (Eriksson et al., 2015a). A co-
managed structure allows for an empowered and organized
group of stakeholders to jointly develop a plan with clear
objectives on how to “steer” the fishery. In this regard,
improvements can be made simply by formalizing pre-agreed
objectives of the fishery and reference limits defining the bounds
of unsatisfactory management performance (FAO, 2003). Better
steering of the SSFs will come from stronger engagement with
fishers and new pathways for them to feedback ideas and
concerns to fishery managers and academics.
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The Brake
Output controls can be seen as the “brake” in SSF management,
because they can slow down the rate of fishing mortality.
Although there are exceptions (e.g., Salas et al., 2007), managers
of SSFs in many developing countries have relied too much
on output controls (e.g., size limits, catch quotas) compared to
important input controls such as limited-entry rules, seasonal
closures, and vessel limits (Dalzell and Adams, 1997; Purcell et al.,
2014). For example, of the Pacific Island sea cucumber fisheries,
30% have quotas and size limits (output controls) but none
have capacity controls on boats and only one has limited entry
regulations (input controls) (Purcell et al., 2013, Supplemental
Data). In as much as a car’s speed should not be controlled
predominantly by the brake, fisheries should not be managed
primarily by output controls.
Size limits have been a cornerstone of classic fisheries
management, since they logically protect immature animals
and minimize growth overfishing (Pikitch et al., 2004; Purcell,
2010). However, large individuals contribute the most to
reproduction and recent debate holds that selectivity for large
individuals may result in ecological and evolutionary side effects
to populations (Garcia et al., 2012; Laugen et al., 2014). The
ensuing conclusion is for “balanced” harvests across a wider
spectrum of the stock with consideration of ecosystem structure
and productivity (Garcia et al., 2012). Mono-specific fisheries,
such as those for Trochus niloticus, will probably benefit from
size selectivity imposed on fishers. On the other hand, size limits
are complicated in multi-species fisheries, which predominate
SSFs in developing countries (Salas et al., 2007). The legal sizes
need to be species- or group-specific (Purcell, 2010), which
can be confusing for fishers. Further, enforcement requires
physical inspection of harvested animals, which takes time
and presence. An alternative is to set institutional constraints
and provide incentives for fishers to voluntarily introduce
size selectivity, since markets may preferentially value medium
or large individuals (Reddy et al., 2013; Purcell, 2014). Such
approaches require engagement with communities to help fishers
understand the rationale for size selectivity and support them in
imposing size limits sensibly.
Catch quotas have as many failings as advantages in SSFs. This
regulatory measure shines in monospecific industrial fisheries
with large boats and relatively few fishers (Grafton, 1996), or
in very small fishery units (Léopold et al., 2013). However,
catch quotas struggle to be effective and enforceable in SSFs
and management agencies lack technical capacity to implement
them effectively (Copes, 1986; WHAT, 2000; Salas et al., 2007;
Pomeroy, 2012; Purcell et al., 2013, 2014). Consequently, they
may be inequitable and exceeded without penalty. Thus, catch
quotas will be unmanageable in many SSFs.
The Handbrake
The “handbrake” in SSF management corresponds to a long-
term ban, or “moratorium,” in the fishery as a measure to halt
fishing. Such a drastic measure is needed when the fishery is
veering seriously off-track or exploitation has been too fast to
adapt management measures. A moratorium can be considered
a pseudo-management measure, since its effect is to stop the
fishery, rather than manage exploitation. Bans, or even long
(>1 y) periodic closures, disrupt livelihoods, supply chains, and
post-harvest processing skills and infrastructure, which may have
taken years to develop. Denying access to national resources does
not go down too well with traditional users, and may precipitate
unrest or violence (Shepherd et al., 2004; Salayo et al., 2008).
Therefore, in as much as a handbrake should only be used in an
emergency to stop a speeding car, fishing bans should be used
as a last resort and certainly not a regular practice for managing
fisheries.
Fishery bans may last 5 to 10 years to allow the stocks to
recover, but some resources may require much more time for
breeding populations to be rebuilt. Sometimes bans are lifted too
early, before stocks have had much time to mature and become
dense again (Skewes et al., 2010). Most importantly, if a ban has
been imposed due to overfishing then the management system
must be substantially changed before the ban is lifted to resume
fishing.
The Accelerator
The accelerator of SSFs is the set of elements that act to
speed up exploitation. In SSFs in developing countries, the
main force is open access which allows too many fishers to
operate in the fishery, often resulting in over-capacity (Pomeroy,
2011). This pace of exploitation is strongly influenced by the
resource users (i.e., fishers) yet also tempered by managers
via input controls. By and large, the problem facing SSFs
is that the pace of exploitation by fishers is too fast, often
because of the sheer number of fishers, and exploitation
rates are not regulated enough by input controls (Dalzell and
Adams, 1997; Sugiyama et al., 2004; Sadovy, 2005). Analyses
from different fisheries illustrate that returns to fishers and
sustainability of stocks decline sharply as participation rates in
the fishery increase (Jennings and Polunin, 1996; Sadovy, 2005;
Purcell et al., 2013). Over-capitalisation of fisheries with larger
boats and fleets greatly compounds this problem (Pomeroy,
2011).
Difficult decisions will need to be made about the use and
impacts of fishing rights and access control measures as there
will be positive and negative social and economic implications.
Preferential access rights can be assigned to coastal areas for
small-scale fishers through group fishing rights and territorial
use rights (TURFs). Some SSFs will be well suited to community
property rights systems (Castilla et al., 2007). Group fishing rights
and TURFs require the group’s understanding of the value of
the rights, the capability to co-manage the resource, the need
to restrict group membership, and the ability to limit access.
However, in some SSFs, the cultural or social context does not
allow managers to impose limited-entry rules to trim the number
of fishers (Salayo et al., 2008; Pomeroy, 2012; Carbonetti et al.,
2014; Purcell et al., 2014). Fishers denied access to traditionally
fished resources may also struggle economically. Fortunately,
restricting who can have access to the resource is not the only
input control at hand.
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More focus is needed on the control of fishing effort (Dalzell
and Adams, 1997; Sadovy, 2005; Pomeroy, 2012; Purcell et al.,
2014). This means using other input controls, such as limits
on boat size and fishing seasons, to restrain fishing within
sustainable limits. Restricting boat size can prevent fisheries
evolving to semi-industrial modes, where teams of fishers are able
to access distant fishing grounds and must fish more intensely
to cover larger capital costs (Purcell, 2010). Vessel restrictions
would benefit many SSFs but will be difficult to implement in
certain fisheries (Pomeroy, 2012).
Seasonal closures are applied in many places and limit the
amount of days in a year that fishers have to harvest the
resource (Salas et al., 2007; Purcell et al., 2014). However,
seasonal closures are often based upon reproductive seasons,
rather than effort limitation, and closure periods are often too
short to meaningfully reduce annual fishing effort. Very short
fishing seasons (e.g., a few days or weeks p.a.) have been set
in a few rare cases—and been highly successful (e.g., Bertram,
1995; McClanahan, 2011; Léopold et al., 2013). Good fishery
performance rests in both the fact that annual fishing effort can
be modified over time to match the turnover rates of the stock,
and catch monitoring becomes affordable over short periods.
Short fishing seasons are appropriate for export commodities like
beche-de-mer and trochus shell but less so for when the resource
is for food security (e.g., reef fish) or needed on a regular basis to
maintain export supply chains (e.g., aquarium fish, live reef fish
food).
Whethermanagers choose to regulate fishing effort or capacity
by limited-entry rules, vessel capacity, or fishing duration, or a
combination of these, is not so crucial. The important point is
that fishing effort must be eased by one means or another to
achieve sustainability—that is, measures imposed to ease off the
accelerator. This will take hard decisions that will be socially
unpopular. However, inaction will surely have greater ecological
and social consequences in the longer-term.
The Backseat Driver
An emerging problem in fisheries is that much of the paradigms
about management are made by academics and scientists in
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with no
professional work experience with managing fisheries and some
are unaware of the realities that SSFmanagers face in low-income
countries. This means that management advice from scientists or
NGOs takes scientists’ or NGOs’ perspectives. In effect, scientists
and NGOs become the “backseat driver”: the person voicing
directions to the driver (the fishery manager) from a distance.
Management measures advocated by [us] scientists and
NGOs are biased toward certain measures. In particular, marine
reserves have become the poster-child for marine conservation
and management. This focus stems to a fair extent from
the fact that marine reserve (marine protected area [MPA]
or no-take zone [NTZ]) research is logically feasible and of
intellectual interest (McClanahan, 2011). The scientific literature
is flooded with articles about marine reserves (McClanahan,
2011), many recommending them as a main solution to fisheries
management (Johnson et al., 2013). Consequently, many NGOs
push for the use of MPAs in developing countries, and it is
no coincidence that human resources in fishery management
agencies are disproportionately weighted on planning and
implementing MPAs at the expense of other management tasks
(Purcell et al., 2014). While well enforced no-take reserves
are superb for conservation, they may or may not have a big
impact on sustainability of stocks in fishing grounds, especially
where enforcement is weak (McClanahan et al., 2006; Purcell
et al., 2013). Our point is that over-weighting of advice from
scientists on certain management measures may indeed lead to
imbalanced management and the neglect of regulatory measures
and management actions that may be more important for fishery
sustainability.
Conclusions
Improving SSFs should involve closer and more practical
links (e.g., work placements) between scientists/NGOs and
fishery managers, better balance of input and output control
measures to reduce fishing pressure, and better information
exchange among fishers, fishery managers, and scientists/NGOs
(Figure 2). Management in SSFs has often relied too heavily on
output controls (the brake) without addressing the exploitation
pressures (the accelerator). Input controlsmay also fail if not used
in combination with other regulatory measures, so the key is to
impose a balanced set of both input and output controls. In low-
income countries, development is the key issue, so there tends to
be a focus on exploitation by the government, and conservation
by NGOs. In many cases, exploitation has sped out of control,
forcing managers to place moratoria (the handbrake) on fishing.
Just as a car cannot be driven with the accelerator constantly
depressed, a fishery cannot be managed sustainably with fishing
effort at continuous full pace. SSF managers need to either greatly
restrict the number of fishers, or boat size or days per year that
fishers can exploit the resource. We realize the dilemma here that
fisheries are important for the welfare, livelihoods and economic
security of the poor (Béné et al., 2010) yet the glaring solution is
to restrict effort. Failing to rein in fishing capacity and/or effort
in small scale fisheries will continue to result in overfishing and
loss of future livelihoods, biodiversity and ecosystem functions
of exploited species. The solutions need to be culturally and
context specific, and integrated socially through forums with
fishers (McClanahan et al., 2009).
Difficult decisions will need to be made about the use and
impacts of fishing rights and access control measures as there
will be positive and negative social and economic implications.
Implementation of any control measure must be simple and
cost-effective due to limited resources for administration and
enforcement. Livelihoods must be considered to be an equal
and complementary approach to fisheries management measures
(Allison and Ellis, 2001). We must make fisheries managers,
fishers and development agencies more aware of the range
of fisheries management measures available to them. The
corollary is that scientists and NGOs (the backseat drivers)
need to turn their focus to researching a wider range of
management measures (McClanahan, 2011; Johnson et al., 2013).
Scientists and research students will need to engage more
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FIGURE 2 | Old and improved structures for information exchange
and regulatory controls in small-scale fisheries. Solid lines denote the
development and imposition of regulatory controls; dotted lines denote
communication pathways. The improved structure sees exchange of
information among NGOs/academics and fishery managers and fishers,
inputs from fishers to the development of regulatory measures, closer
physical collaborations between NGOs/academics and fishery managers,
and a better balance of input and output control measures.
actively with fishery managers and fishers to become part of the
solution.
Governance must also be strengthened in SSFs in developing
countries, especially through unwavering political will on the
part of political and judicial leaders and bureaucrats (Carbonetti
et al., 2014). Inaction of political and judicial leaders in enforcing
laws and regulations may be due to alleged or real corruption
or due to the real or perceived negative impacts of fisheries
management decisions on fishers’ livelihoods, incomes and food
security. Several potential ideal-type pathways for overcoming
hurdles to lack of political will and capacity exist, including the
importance of leadership on fisheries governance at both the local
and national level (Pomeroy et al., 2001; Gutiérrez et al., 2011),
and the education of the public to generate the values necessary
to ensure cooperation and enforcement of fisheries management
policies.
The only effective solution will be one based on a
coordinated and integrated approach involving resource
management, resource restoration and conservation,
livelihood, economic, and community development, and
restructured governance arrangements (Pomeroy, 2013). This
implies an increased focus on human solutions involving
participation, livelihoods, rights, and communities (Allison
and Ellis, 2001). The foundation of such an approach
should be a plan that has been developed and agreed upon
through a participatory process (see Figure 2), and which
identifies goals and objectives, management and development
strategies and actions, and the roles and responsibilities of all
partners.
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